JCB BLOG

The Mumbai attacks: Early warnings pointing to Lashkar E Taiba

Early claims from an unknown terrorist group, the Deccan Mujahideen, supposedly an offshoot of the Indian Mujahideen (itself an emanation of the Students Islamic Movement of India –SIMI-), have raised fresh speculations that the Mumbai attacks could have been carried out by Indian “home-grown” terrorists.

Despite the fact that the IM/SIMI group had carried out several attacks in the past on the Indian Territory (mostly bomb attacks), the modus operandi used by the Mumbai attackers was consistent with the Pakistani Al Qaeda affiliated group Lashkar E Taiba (LeT) reported tactics, especially the plot to infiltrate Mumbai by the sea to carry out terrorist attacks.

We can report that in early 2007, a little noticed similar plot has been foiled by the Indian police, leading to the arrest of several LeT members. In March 2007, two Pakistani militants of LeT confessed that they had infiltrated into the Indian Territory in a group of eight through sea route from Karachi to Mumbai. This was the first reported infiltration of Pakistani militants through sea-route. Two Indians were also arrested for providing assistance to the LeT militants.

The same month, on March 8, 2007, A.K. Antony, the Indian minister of Defense publicly admitted before the Parliament that several intelligence reports warned that “terrorists of various organizations have received training for their infiltration through sea routes” and that such infiltrations were “likely”.

Initial details from the Indian investigation indicate that the attackers were heavily armed, that their tactics were “military tactics”. They were also provided with sophisticated communication devices, false IDs and several credit-cards from Citibank, HSBC, ICICI Bank, Axis Bank, HDFC Bank and SBM (State Bank of Mauritius), in addition to cash money.

These sophisticated, well-planned, financed and coordinated attacks were all but expected. The Mumbai attacks demonstrate the growing organizational and financial means of the radical Islamic terrorist groups in the region.

UN: Taliban raising half a billion dollars a year from opium production

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime has just released its Afghanistan Opium Survey for 2008.

 

The report highlights the fact that Taliban-affiliated war-lords, drug-lords and insurgents have extracted “almost half a billion dollars of tax revenue from drug farming, production and trafficking” in 2008. As reported, “not surprisingly the insurgents’ war machine has proven so resilient, despite the heavy pounding by Afghan and allied forces.”

 

The Hilmand province, the main Taliban operational center, remained the single largest opium cultivating province with 103,500 ha in 2008 (66% of the total cultivation in Afghanistan).

EU Court orders delisting of PMOI

The Court of First Instance of the European Communities today annulled the European Union Council of Ministers’ decision (2007/868) to maintain the People’s Mujahideen Organization of Iran (PMOI or MEK) on the EU terrorist list, ruling that the EU had failed to give sufficient reasons to keep the PMOI on the list, following a British judgment of the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission removing the organization from the national list.

The Court found that “having regard to all the relevant information at the date when Decision 2007/868 was adopted, and taking account of the particular circumstances of the case, (…) the statement of reasons is obviously insufficient to provide legal justification for continuing to freeze the applicant’s funds.”

Earlier this year, on September 3, the European Court of Justice suspended the EU sanctions against Yassin Al Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation.

Relevant documents regarding the PMOI case:
- Press Release of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, October 23, 2008
- Judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, October 23, 2008
- Judgment of the UK Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission, November 30, 2007
- EU Council Decision 2007/868, December 20, 2007

U.S. Treasury reports increased terrorist funds blocked in the U.S.

The U.S. Treasury has released its latest Report to Congress on Assets in the United States of Terrorist Countries and International Terrorism Program Designees (known are Terrorist Assets Report or TAR).

The amount of blocked funds pertaining to international terrorist organizations and individuals, totaled over $20.7 million in 2007, compared to $16.4 million in 2006. Of that, over $11.3 million constituted assets of Al Qaeda, an increase of almost 46 percent over the level blocked as of the end of 2006.

In May 2008, the U.N. Monitoring Team reported that $85 million of Al Qaeda related funds had been frozen worldwide by 36 countries.

According to the U.S. Treasury, “The increase in blocked terrorist organization assets in 2007 is due to new or additional blockings, interest paid on blocked funds, and increased share price on certain blocked securities.”

As of December 31, 2007, a total of 478 individuals and entities had been identified or designated and remain listed as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists”, including 42 organizations or groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the Department of State.

ECJ ruling: A threat to the Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions (Head of the UN sanctions monitoring team)

The Washington Institute recently published an interesting article by Richard Barrett, head of the al Qaeda/Taliban monitoring team for the UN, on how the recent ruling by the European Court of Justice on Yassin Al Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation could put at risk the UN terrorism sanctions regime. Richard Barrett raises several practical obstacles to a softening of the current regime, in addition to the legal issues raised on this blog. We are publishing his article with the Washington Institute’s permission.

Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Threatened
By Richard Barrett
October 6, 2008

In early September, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) -- the highest court in the European Union -- ruled that the EU's application of UN sanctions against Yasin Qadi and the al-Barakaat International Foundation infringed their basic rights, and declared the action illegal under EU law. Although the judgment applies only to these two parties, the ruling has far-reaching consequences, for not only the EU but also the entire UN system of targeted sanctions.

ECJ Ruling

The EU imposed sanctions on Qadi, a Saudi businessman, and al-Barakaat, a money remitter in Sweden, when they appeared on the UN Security Council's al-Qaeda/Taliban list in October 2001. Although countries must implement Security Council sanctions, they can choose how to do so. EU member states adopted a regulation that automatically applied sanctions to any individual or entity mentioned by the UN. The sanctions include an assets freeze and severe travel restrictions.

The ECJ overturned a lower court ruling that suggested EU member states had little choice but to handle UN designations in this pro forma manner. The ECJ decided that despite their obligations under the UN Charter, EU members could not adopt a regulation that infringed rights integral to EU law. What most concerned the court was that the listed parties were not informed of their wrongdoing and had no opportunity to put their case before an independent review body.

The court neither questioned the right of the Security Council to impose sanctions, nor asked if such action was appropriate. Furthermore, the court gave the EU three months to address the identified problems before the judgment took effect. But whatever the EU does, the court has issued a major challenge to the use of sanctions as an international counterterrorism tool.

Although Qadi and al-Barakaat remain on the UN list, the twenty-seven EU member states will need to find a new way to implement the sanctions against them -- in a manner that satisfies the court. If they fail to do so, the UN sanctions regime may collapse.

The UN Regime

The Security Council developed targeted sanctions because blanket sanctions had a far greater impact on the population at large than on the decisionmakers whose behavior it hoped to change. Indeed, the al-Qaeda/Taliban sanctions began in 1999 as a way to stop the Taliban supporting al-Qaeda and to encourage them to hand Osama bin Laden over for trial. It was only after the overthrow of the Taliban that the sanctions became the first Security Council regime to target individuals with no connections to a state -- and therefore no voice at the UN.

The Security Council recognized this situation created special problems. In 2006, it devised a system whereby individuals could seek a listing review through a focal point in the UN Secretariat. Since then, the Council has gone further by adopting a resolution this past June that will lead to narrative summaries of the reasons for all listings appearing on its website.

This may not be enough, however, to address all the concerns about the Council's procedures. Although the regime is intended to be preventative, its impact is widely seen as punitive. As such, many argue that it should observe a satisfactory measure of due-process rules. For the ECJ, the key issues are the adequate notification of the listed parties and the provision of effective judicial review.

Security Council Options

The Security Council could do nothing and leave the problem to member states to resolve, but this is probably not the best option. If the Security Council wants to retain targeted sanctions as a tool against terrorism -- or any other threat -- it will need to demonstrate to the rest of the international community that its listing procedures involve as much due process as a domestic court might reasonably expect.
Unfortunately, this is not easy. For instance, although the Council could allow individuals and entities more scope to present their cases, it is impossible to imagine it permitting an independent body to overturn its decisions. Furthermore, the Security Council is an intergovernmental body -- not part of a judicial system -- and any organ that it creates to review its decisions would be regarded similarly. The ECJ clearly expressed its view that no intergovernmental body could carry out an effective review.

A second problem is that much of the information about terrorist groups and individuals is obtained from sensitive sources, and there are few jurisdictions around the world that admit evidence that is not also available to the defendant. If a listing is proposed on the basis of such information, the Council may at present take the assurances of the designating state at face value. In the future, the Security Council will have to consider carefully whether it is worth including a name on the list if it causes states to run the risk of a successful legal challenge. This may lead to the list containing the names of only well-known supporters of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, thereby losing some of its preventative function.

Preserving Targeted Sanctions

The best way forward would be for each Council member, particularly those most likely to face legal challenges, to ensure that every listing meets the standards expected by its domestic courts. The United States already does this by taking proposed listings through a long and detailed examination to ensure that any domestic legal challenge would be likely to fail. The record of success so far suggests that this system works. Other members of the Council may not have access to as much information, but if they are uncertain whether their courts would challenge the case, they can always ask for more information or refuse the listing. The al-Qaeda/Taliban list will never be exhaustive, and even if it becomes more limited, it can still reflect the main components of the terrorist threat and continue its symbolic value as an expression of international condemnation.

Concerns about notification will be largely solved when the reasons for listing appear routinely on the UN website. Coupled with this, states can inform newly listed individuals and entities of the sanctions, and inform them of the ramifications. Listed parties can then approach national or regional courts, like the ECJ, to ask for a review of the case against them, and the courts can make a decision on the basis of the supplied information.

The debate about the fairness of Council procedures will likely continue, but if challenges regularly fail, overall confidence in the regime will grow. This will lead not only to more-effective implementation, but also to more enthusiastic engagement; it will revive the sanctions regime and reinvigorate international action against terrorism. There may be an argument for the Council to improve its procedures, but improvement need not involve a fundamental revision of its critically important role in global counterterrorism.

Richard Barrett is coordinator of the UN's al-Qaeda/Taliban Monitoring Team.

The European Court of Justice challenging the UN terrorism sanctions regime: A legal perspective

On September 3, the European Court of Justice delivered an unprecedented and stunning blow to the international terrorism sanctions regime by annulling the EU freezing of assets imposed on Yassin Al Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation pursuant to a UN Security Council Resolution (ECJ Press Release and ECJ ruling.pdf).

While intervening countries had raised the “absolute lack of jurisdiction of the (Court) to carry out any review of resolutions of the Security Council”, the Court claimed an indirect competence based on the fact that the UN Security Council Resolution was implemented by EU regulations, and therefore subject to the Court review. The Court added that because the sanctions were not an “act directly attributable to the United Nations as an action of one of its subsidiary organs (…) or an action falling within the exercise of powers lawfully delegated by the Security Council”, no international principle excluded the “judicial review of the internal lawfulness of the (EU) regulation in the light of fundamental freedoms.”

To establish its competence, the Court argued that “an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties or, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system”. It follows, according to the Court, that “the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental rights.”

Therefore, and despite its statement that “the review of lawfulness thus to be ensured by the Community judicature applies to the Community act intended to give effect to the international agreement at issue, and not to the latter as such”, the Court nevertheless reviewed the effectiveness of the UN sanctions procedures themselves, stating that the UN “re-examination procedure does not offer the guarantees of judicial protection” or that “the procedure before (the UN Sanctions Committee) is still in essence diplomatic and intergovernmental, the persons or entities concerned having no real opportunity of asserting their rights.”

Most of the Court’s critics addressed the absence of rights of defense for the designated individuals or entities in the implementation of the UN sanctions, notwithstanding the fact that member states had no latitude in this regard by virtue of the UN resolutions. Among these rights, the Court mentioned the absence of a “procedure for communicating the evidence justifying the inclusion of the names of the persons” and “for hearing those persons, either at the same time as that inclusion or later.” The Court ruled that “the principle of effective judicial protection has been infringed” and that the regulation imposed an “unjustified restriction of (the) right to property.”

Following an earlier opinion of the Advocate General to the European Court of Justice, the Court reversed the first instance ruling and decided to annul EU Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban in so far as it concerns Yassin Al Kadi and the Al Barakaat International Foundation. The Court provided nevertheless that its effect should be maintained for three months until the implementation of a new regulation to remedy the infringements found, because “Mr. Kadi and Al Barakaat might take steps seeking to prevent measures freezing funds from being applied to them again.”

The reasoning of the Court to establish its competence ignored or disregarded the most basic principles of normative hierarchy in international law. First, the Court wrongly defined the UN Security Council resolution as an “international agreement”. According to article 103 of the UN Charter, obligations under the Charter (especially binding decisions of the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII), prevail over ”any other international agreement”, including a community agreement such as the establishment of the European Union. The EU, as any other regional community, is governed by the international legal order under the United Nations. As clearly stated in 1999 by UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (establishing the Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctions regime), member states have an obligation to “act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement.”

In that regard, the Court main argument that the EU had established an “autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an international agreement” is a pure conceptual fiction that doesn’t find any legal basis in international law.

Faced with what in fact was a conflict of norms (the EU legal system versus the UN legal system) that may, according to international law principles, only be resolved in favor of UN decisions, the Court simply chose to avoid it by stating that “the question of the Court’s jurisdiction arises in the context of the internal and autonomous legal order of the Community”.

The Court failed to recognize that EU sanctions were in no way “autonomous”, but the direct result of the “binding effect” of the decisions of the UN Security Council taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The best proof of the artificial construction of the Court was provided by the Court itself when it had to review the UN sanctions mechanism and procedures to determine the effectiveness of the rights of defense of the designated individuals and entities, thus recognizing that the EU was only implementing an international obligation which procedures were international in essence, not national. As evidenced in 2005 by the Court of First Instance of the European Communities in the Kadi case, the UE “acted under circumscribed powers, with the result that they had no autonomous discretion. In particular, they could neither directly alter the content of the resolutions at issue nor set up any mechanism capable of giving rise to such alteration.” By reviewing the UN sanctions procedures, the ECJ exceeded its own jurisdiction, limited to the “interpretation or validity of a provision of Community law”, and conventions or measures implementing such provisions (Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union).

In failing to acknowledge the primacy of obligations under the UN Charter and in allowing itself to reverse UN sanctions, the Court followed a dangerous judicial policy trend toward the fragmentation of international law, in a way that could fundamentally jeopardize the global uniform application of UN sanctions and the coherence of the international legal system.

In trying to assert the unrealistic legal autonomy of the European legal system through an unrestrained conception of the human rights, the primary effect of this ruling is to undercut everything positive that the UN Security Council has tried to achieve in preventing and combating terrorism.

The ECJ ruling raises several legal and practical questions. Although it does not immediately affect each EU member state’s individual obligation as member of the UN, to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions, European states will be facing an obvious conflict of law if no new regulation is passed within 3 months.

At the same time, it’s hard to figure out how the UN Security Council will conceive the framing of a specific due process mechanism outside the scope of the UN legal framework without opening the way to similar claims from other regional or national entities, and thus endangering the coherence and uniformity of the entire UN sanctions regime.

As far as legal questions are involved, the UN Security Council could decide to request the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on this issue. According to Article 96.1 of the UN Charter "the General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question". This procedure could provide a clear legal framework for the uniform implementation and enforcement of the UN terrorism sanctions mechanism and prevent similar challenges to the sanctions regime that will now inevitably arise from other states outside the European Union.

Saudi authorities finally understand that terrorists need funds to terrorize

During an interview with Saudi newspaper Asharq Al Awsat published on June 18, Interior Minister Prince Naif announced that security officials are close to uncovering the sources of terror funding in the Kingdom.

The Saudi minister seems to finally connect the dots: "The terrorists would not have been able to act in this way without the financial support given to them" (sic) he said.

He added that security agencies have information which might point to the financiers of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. He stated: "Many things have become available to us but they need to be completed and this is what we are doing. In the end, we hope it will not be long before we inform the public of all these facts."

We all hope that almost 7 years after the 9/11 attacks and 20 years after the foundation of Al Qaeda, the Saudi government finally acts to stop terror financing by Saudi charities and individuals. For years Western and U.S. officials identified Saudi Arabia as the “epicenter of terrorism financing”. But the Saudis failed to identify and punish the backers of the terrorists.

Recent news, such as the alleged participation of Wael Hamza Julaidan, an Al Qaeda founder and designated terrorist, in a public symposium of the Wamy organization as a "major speaker", had raised additional concerns as to the willingness of the Saudis to fight terrorism financing. If history is of any guidance, Prince Naif's statement may yet be another empty promise by the Saudis.

Legal News on Terrorism Financing: Kadi, IARA, Libya

- EU: ECJ’s Advocate General opinion on Yassin Al Kadi case
The ECJ released today an opinion of Poiares Maduro, Advocate General to the European Court of Justice suggesting to reverse the Court of First Instance judgment that denied Yassin Al Kadi’s challenge of the EU sanctions regulations, and to annul the European Council sanctions against him.

- US: IARA grand jury indictment
A federal grand jury today returned a 42-count indictment against IARA (Islamic American Relief Agency) and several former officers for engaging in prohibited financial transactions (for an amount of $130,000 in 2003 and 2004) for the benefit of U.S.-designated terrorist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

- US: District Court awarding damages to families of UTA Flight 772 victims
US District Judge Henry Kennedy ruled that the Libyan government and six Libyan officials should pay more than $6 billion in damages to families of seven Americans who died in the 1989 bombing of French passenger jet UTA Flight 772, which killed all 170 people on board.

The Swiss Kadi case ends up in a judicial fiasco

Six years after opening in fanfare one of its major post-9/11 investigations on terrorism financing, the Swiss prosecution’s office decided on December 13 to drop all charges against alleged Saudi Al Qaeda financier Yassin Abdullah Al Kadi.

Having been involved in this investigation as an expert for the prosecution, I will not comment on the specific allegations and evidence gathered in the course of the investigation, and limit my comments to the context of this case.

From what I witnessed during this six-year long investigation opened on October 15, 2001, this decision mainly reflects the failure of the Swiss prosecution and judicial system, unprepared and unequipped to handle such a complex case, unable to obtain the cooperation of foreign countries, and therefore unable to avoid the many legal hurdles and challenges provided by Kadi’s lawyers during the course of the procedure.

I’ve even experienced the inability of the prosecution to defend its own experts, when Yassin Al Kadi filed a lawsuit against the Swiss prosecutor to challenge my expert mandate, or when he filed a criminal complaint against me for allegedly violating the secrecy of my expert mandate, a case finally dismissed by a special prosecutor appointed to investigate the matter.

During the investigation of the case, I’ve always been stunned by the apparent overconfidence of the prosecutors, their loud statements that the case will be “successful” given the extent of the U.S. allegations.

The decision is also a major setback for the U.S. government, who initially pressured the Swiss authorities to open an investigation, but failed to convert its allegations, mostly based on secret intelligence information, into actionable evidence for prosecution purposes. Despite the strong claim expressed in 2001 by the former U.S. Treasury Department’s general counsel that Kadi “has a long history of financing and facilitating the activities of terrorists and terrorist-related organizations, often acting through seemingly legitimate charitable enterprises and businesses”, the U.S. government has been unable or unwilling to provide enough supporting evidence to help the Swiss case or to open its own criminal case.

The weakness of the case became obvious when information recently transpired in the press that the Swiss authorities had extended their investigation to include international collateral and tangential networks, while Kadi was initially accused by the Swiss authorities of “having transferred several millions of dollars in his capacity of former president of the Muwafaq Foundation, to close associates of the Al Qaeda network, using Swiss bank accounts”.

Switzerland now offers a record of major setbacks in the prosecution of terrorism cases, including the failed prosecution of Al Taqwa Bank and Youssef Nada and the acquittal of alleged members of a support cell for the 2003 Riyadh bombings, and could well become eligible for the worst practice in handling such cases.

This new and major failure raises the question of the seriousness and efficiency of the entire war against terrorism financing, especially when the U.S. government relies on third countries to prosecute alleged terrorist financiers. In most cases, without proper coordination among the international prosecution efforts, without specific competence to prosecute complex terrorism financing cases, and without clear evidence sharing processes, these individuals will avoid legal sanctions.

Swiss Supreme Court keeps Youssef Nada on the Terrorist List

On November 14, the Swiss Supreme Court (in a ruling published on November 27) dismissed a claim filed by Youssef Nada to be removed along with several entities, including Al Taqwa Bank, from the Swiss Decree of October 2, 2000, implementing UN sanctions against individuals and entities associated with Osama Bin laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Youssef Nada justified his claim that he should be removed from the list, with the decision of the Swiss Federal Prosecutor of 31 May 2005 to drop the charges against him and Al Taqwa Bank, following a criminal investigation on Al Taqwa opened in October 2001.

The Supreme Court, referring to previous judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), ruled that the Swiss sanctions were not “autonomous”, but the result of the “binding effect” of the decisions of the UN Security Council taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This decision “not only prevails over the domestic law of the member states, but also over any other obligations from international conventions, according to article 103 of the Charter”. The Court therefore ruled that “the global uniform application of UN sanctions would be jeopardized if the courts of individual member states could amend or reverse sanctions against individuals or entities because of possible violations of fundamental rights under the European Convention of Human Rights and the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.

Following previous ECJ rulings, the Court stated that the binding effect of UNSC decisions could only be limited by a norm of “jus cogens”, mandatory fundamental provisions of the international law applicable to all international legal entities, including the organs of the UN.

Regarding Nada’s claim that UN sanctions were adopted in contradiction to norms of jus cogens (usually referring to basic human rights) the Court ruled that “fundamental rights (such as property rights, rights of defense and the right to effective judicial protection) are not absolute”. It further stated that the UN sanction mechanism was limited in its nature and time and provides a delisting process.

The Court found that the procedural guarantees raised by the plaintiff as ineffective in the case of the UN sanctions (right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy) were not considered as “core provisions of international human rights conventions”. In fact, article 15-2 of the European Convention on Human Rights excluded such provisions from the norms for which no derogations are admitted. Therefore, the Court concluded that such norms were not “jus cogens”.

Interestingly, the same day of the Swiss Supreme Court ruling, the U.S. government and the UN decided to remove another Al Taqwa director, Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, from the terrorist sanctions list.

According to a statement of the U.S. Treasury Department, the decision was taken because Mr Nasreddin “no longer fits the criteria for designation” after he has submitted signed statements to the Office of Foreign Assets Control certifying that he has terminated any business relationships with Nada, Bank al Taqwa, “and any other designated individuals and entities, and that he will have no such dealings in the future.” “In the event that Mr. Nasreddin recommences his support for designated terrorist entities, OFAC will not hesitate to re-designate him,” the Treasury statement said. Is Youssef Nada next?

The Swiss Supreme Court ruling is available in its original German language (tf_youssef_nada.pdf).

European terror arrests: The Bosnian connection

A European terror cell that recruited suicide bombers and insurgent fighters for Iraq and Afghanistan has been dismantled yesterday in a series of coordinated raids in Italy, France and Portugal.

20 Algerian and Tunisian militants have been arrested throughout Europe. The leaders of the group, Dridi Sabri, Mehdi Ben Nasr and Imed Ben Zarkaoui where operating from Northern Italy since at least 2002.

Among the arrested cell members in Italy was Bechir Kaouana (37), a Tunisian who since 1999 is known to have connections with the terrorist network of Essid Sami Ben Khemais. During searches at his home at the time, propaganda material was found, including a videotape on “Jihad in Chechnya” with pictures of fighting mujahideen and summary executions of Russian soldiers captured by Chechen rebels.

Another arrested cell member, Tunisian Habib Ignaoua (47), was also identified in 1998 as a member of the cell of Ben Khemais. According to Italian legal records, Ignaoua is as a veteran of the Bosnian war.

Two other men were arrested in England under an extradition warrant from the Italian authorities on charges of providing logistical support to the cell between 2003 and 2005. The Italians charged them for providing forged documents facilitating the illegal entry into Italy of recruited volunteers on their way to fight jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ali Ben Zidane Chehidi (34), was arrested in the London suburb of Croydon, and Mohamed Salah Ben Hamadi Khemiri (53), was arrested in the northern English city of Manchester.

Interestingly, Khemiri is also a veteran of the Bosnian war, where he is believed to have fought with the Muslim Mujahideen Brigade according to our sources. One document from the Bosnian police lists “Mohamed Salah Khemiri”, son of Hamad, born on April 7, 1954 in Beja, Tunisia. Khemiri was granted Bosnian citizenship in 1995, as were hundreds of foreign fighters.

In a pattern recently highlighted by the British MI5 Director-General, the cell was recruiting young candidates for suicide bombings. The core of the network was led and coordinated by Algerian and Tunisian veterans of the Bosnian war, that now appears as a key factor in many European terrorist networks.

According to the Italian investigation, the cell was financed by the trafficking of false passports and by donations raised in mosques. The cell was using legitimate businesses fronts to cover its activities, including butcher shops, call centers and car dealers.

During an intercepted telephone conversation in November 2006, the leader of cell reportedly said: “We want projects for the long term. Create a group of three or four persons with no criminal records, and with legal documents. We should open three or four butcher shops in Italy, and France. We should open a call center and trade in clothing. I’m talking about projects that bring profits."

Click to view an exclusive surveillance video of the cell provided by the Special Operations Unit of the Italian police (ros_surveillance_tape.avi).

An inside look at the Swiss investigation on Yassin Al Kadi

The Canadian press recently provided an inside look into the Swiss investigation on Yassin Al Kadi. According to the report, in 2006 the Swiss judge investigating the case of Yassin Al Kadi has requested the Canadian judicial cooperation to provide insights on Kadi’s relationship to Ibrahim Afandi, a Saudi businessman who has been for years a member of the executive board of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and whose name appeared on a list of individuals referred to within al Qaeda as the “Golden Chain,” wealthy donors to mujahideen efforts, that we’ve recovered from archives of a Bosnian charity in 2003. His name also appeared in the Al Taqwa Bank phonebook seized at Youssef Nada's house in 2001.

The Swiss judge specifically requested access to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) files in order to assess “links and/or interesting similarities between some financial set-ups performed by Mr. Yasin Al Kadi and Mr. Ibrahim Afandi”.

In an unusual interview during the course of an ongoing investigation, the Swiss judge said she was “looking for evidence, for connections with other proceedings” in America and Europe.

The Canadian press report suggests that the Swiss authorities are carrying out a broad investigation, extended from the Swiss transactions that have shaped the initial prosecution, to include international collateral and tangential networks.

The ongoing case against Al Kadi was opened by the Swiss Federal Prosecutor on October 15, 2001. Al Kadi was formally charged in July 2003 of participating to a criminal organization. In June 2005, the case was transferred to a Swiss Federal investigative judge.

The European Court of Justice prohibits real property transactions for designated terrorists

On October 11, the European Court of Justice issued an important ruling regarding the interpretation and scope of the international sanctions mechanism of assets freezing for real property transactions.

UN resolution 1390 (2002) adopting sanctions against individuals and entities designated as associated to Al Qaeda and the Taliban decided that States shall freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of the individuals whose names appear on the list, including “funds derived from property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction”.

But the UN Monitoring Group reported in November 2003 that several states have been reluctant to freeze tangible assets such as business or property. In October 2003, The FAFT also issued an interpretative note regarding the property to be seized and the procedures to be used. It made it clear that the obligation to freeze funds and other assets, pursuant to various UN resolutions, included "those [assets] wholly or jointly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by designated persons". All these efforts have failed until now to prohibit physical, including real property assets, as part of the UN sanctions mechanism.

We first reported in June 2006 that Youssef Nada, former manager of Al Taqwa Bank, was in the process of selling his property located in the Italian enclave of Campione d’Italia in Switzerland, despite his designation under the UN sanctions regime

The case before the ECJ (Möllendorf and others, Case #C-117/06) was brought after Aqeel Al Aqeel, founder of the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation and designated by the US, UN and EU, was due to acquire a real property in Germany. The Court had to resolve the question of whether a transfer of ownership implies that an economic resource is made available, directly or indirectly, to natural or legal persons, groups or entities designated by the Sanctions Committee so as to enable them to obtain funds, goods or services.

The Court ruled that under the sanctions regime a real property transaction is “prohibited” if, “in consequence of that transaction, were it to be allowed, an economic resource is made available to a person listed (…), which would enable the latter to obtain funds, goods or services.”

Although the case before the Court specifically relates to a designated buyer, the wording used by the European judges in their ruling now makes it clear to any State within the territory of the European Union that any real property transaction is prohibited when it involves an individual or an entity designated as terrorist if, as a consequence of that transaction, economic resources, funds, goods or services are made available to such an individual or entity.

This ruling provides an important precedent and a good example of how regional and local Courts may enforce UN regulations when this organization still lacks the proper mandate and tools to do so. We can only hope that this ruling will be followed in other jurisdictions.

A new focus on trade-based terrorism financing

Moneylaundering.com and Fortent Inform recently posted a very interesting article on Trade-Based Money Laundering and terrorism financing to which I contributed. Trading of commodities has been a key terrorism financing vehicle for years, as a way to provide cover for illegal activities and transactions, especially in Sudan and the Balkans.

One of the main characteristics of the Al Qaeda network has been its ability to operate behind a traditional economic and financial network, the best example was provided by the network formed between 1983 and 1996 in Sudan, that crystallized for several years the overall spectrum of facilities and tools at bin Laden’s disposal to carry out its fundamentalist goals, through apparent legitimate companies and charities.

This trend was later observed in many investigations, including in Europe, where an Al Qaeda cell in Spain was operating behind several real estate companies.

In November 2006, a post on a jihadi website (Alsayf.com) was still recommending as an "Innovative method of communication between components of the cell", "to open a small company, real estate office or any industrial company", in order to recruit members, organize meetings and raise funds.

The Moneylaundering.com article suggests that international regulators such as the FATF could focus on new regulations in this field. It is indeed more than necessary, although agreeing and imposing international regulations will not be an easy task, due to the complexity of identifying illegal transactions when confronting legitimate businesses. From the experience of past investigations, this is usually determined in a case by case basis. Regulators could usefully work on identifying and listing patterns of suspicious investments or transactions, based on various parameters of a transaction, including its pricing, financial structure, actors and location.

US: Saudi Arabia failing to stop terrorism funding

Six years after 9/11, the US Treasury Department admitted that much remains to be done in order to stop terrorism financing at its source, something we’ve been advocating for years.

“If I could somehow snap my fingers and cut off the funding from one country, it would be Saudi Arabia,” said Stuart Levey, the US Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, during an interview to ABC News.

No one identified by the United States and the United Nations as a terror financier has been prosecuted by the Saudis, Levey said, adding that “When the evidence is clear that these individuals have funded terrorist organizations, and knowingly done so, then that should be prosecuted and treated as real terrorism because it is”.

The Saudi Foreign minister dismissed Levey’s comment by stating that “We hear every now and then that the kingdom does not do enough. But when we meet with officials, they thank us for our efforts to combat terrorism…They describe the programme we are implementing as one of the most effective on the international scene to confront terrorism, be it on the security or material fronts.”

Indeed, in August 2003, Saudi King Abdullah stated that “whoever harbors a terrorist is a terrorist like him, whoever sympathize with a terrorist is a terrorist like him and those who harbor and sympathize with terrorism will receive their just and deterrent punishment”.

But Saudi Arabia, labelled the “epicenter” of terrorism financing by a US official, has demonstrated a poor record in identifying, investigating and blocking assets, and cooperating with foreign investigations on terrorism financing. The latest summary on “Initiatives and actions taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to combat terrorism”, dated December 2006, reflects that in a three-year period the Saudi authorities have been unable to locate and freeze a single additional bank account since 2003.

The CIA on Al Rajhi Bank

The Wall Street Journal recently reported on new information from the US Government about Al Rajhi Bank.

The article contains references to CIA reports, one of them titled "Al Rajhi Bank: Conduit for Extremist Finance", claiming that one year after 9/11, the Saudi bank was exploring financial instruments "that would allow [its] charitable contributions to avoid official Saudi scrutiny." A report stated that Al Rajhi Bank couriers "delivered money to the Indonesian insurgent group Kompak to fund weapons purchases and bomb-making activities." A U.S. intelligence memo also says a money courier for Osama bin Laden's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, traveled on a visa that the bank had obtained for him.

One of the reports concluded that "Senior Al Rajhi family members have long supported Islamic extremists and probably know that terrorists use their bank." Al Rajhi Bank, which was dismissed from a civil lawsuit in the US in 2005, reacted to the claims in a letter to the Wall Street Journal.

Morocco foils a major terrorist plot (Updated)

On March 11, a major terrorist plot was foiled when Abdelfettah Raydi accidentally detonated his explosive belt in a cybercafé of Casablanca. Raydi's accomplice, Youssef Khoudri, was injured and later arrested.

Click to view a video of the scene:
cybercaf_bombing_casablanca_morocco_11032007.avi

According to the Moroccan State Prosecutor, twelve suicide bombers were prepared to take part in terrorist attacks targeting economic and administrative sites, including foreign ships docks at Casablanca’s port, hotels in Marrakech, Agadir and Essaouira, and other buildings including the police headquarters in Casablanca.

Twenty-four Islamists believed to be part of the plot have been charged. Several members of the cell, including Abdelfettah Raydi himself, were arrested in 2003 after the Casablanca bombings. They were released in November 2005 as part of a royal amnesty. One of them, Abdellatif Amrine was suspected as a “backup” bomber in Casablanca.

Investigators recovered 6.5 kg of TATP explosives, enough to produce 20 explosive belts, as well as several toxic substances. Terrorists had planned to use poison, including a tetanus pathogenic bacteria. The local press reported that a suspected member of the cell is a Moroccan engineer and director of a chemical company of Mohammedia, Cochimag SA, which specializes in fertilizers. This company has links to the now imprisoned high ranking member of the GICM (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group) Saad Houssaini, who is an expert in explosives and chemical devices.

Most of the funding for the operation - estimated to $5,000 - was provided by a Moroccan businessman, Mohamed Talbi, and by the leader of the Ansar Al Mahdi group, a terrorist cell that was dismantled in August 2006. Fifty members of the cell, including its leader Hassan Khattab, an Afghan veteran, are currently jailed pending a trial in May.

After the Moroccan authorities reportedly arrested Algerian Islamists in the Marrakech region, details from Algeria suggest that there are operational connections and strategic coordination between Moroccan Islamists and the former GSPC, now known as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The latest evidence of this was provided with the discovery of a scheme to import Moroccan trucks to Algeria, to be used by the GSPC for terrorist attacks there.

(Originally posted on April 4, 2007)

UPDATE:

Three potential suicide bombers killed themselves and one was killed today by security forces in Casablanca during the investigation into the March 11 bombing.

According to our sources, two of the suicide bombers, Mohamed Mentala and Mohamed Rachidi, were already wanted by the police for their involvement in the May 2003 bombings in Casablanca.

Mentala, who was born in 1975, was identified as a “backup” bomber in Casablanca by a suicide bomber who survived the attack and by another suspect. Three months after the Casablanca bombings of 2003, he formed a terrorist cell with several others, including 37 years old Mohamed Rachidi. The presumed leader of the cell, Youssef Addad, was sentenced to death in December 2006.

We’ve earlier reported that another backup bomber for the 2003 bombings in Casablanca had been indicted. Moroccan authorities are currently screening and interrogating tens of previously released terrorist suspects in the country in an effort to thwart a large scale terrorist attack.

9/11 financial facilitator and intermediary testifies in Guantanamo

Mustafa Ahmed Al Hawsawi, a key Saudi financial facilitator and intermediary for the 9/11 attacks on the United States testified during a hearing held before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal on March 21, according to a verbatim transcript made public today.

Al Hawsawi's pivotal role in providing funds to the 9/11 hijackers had been well established by banking transactions. Al Hawsawi, who had worked under the direct supervision of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed since year 2000, had direct financial ties to Ramzi Binalshibh, the coordinator of the Hamburg hijackers’ cell.

Using UAE bank accounts and aliases, Al Hawsawi arranged for the transfer of funds to the hijackers between 2000 and 2001 from UAE bank accounts. Four of the hijackers returned excess money directly to Al Hawsawi in the UAE days before the attacks. Hawsawi fled the UAE to Pakistan on September 11, 2001.

Al Hawsawi denied any role in the 9/11 plot, but acknowledged sending and receiving funds to and from the hijackers. He also admitted having regular contacts with several hijackers and two masterminds of the attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and Ramzi Binalshibh.

Al Hawsawi was trained in a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and said he met Osama Bin Laden “four or five times” between the second half of year 2000 and the end of September 2001. While denying his membership in Al Qaeda, Al Hawsawi claimed to “helping all the jihadists”.

The hearing also revealed that key financial data, including details of Al Qaeda’s expenses and transaction records for Al Qaeda’s various bank accounts, was recovered in computer hard-drives during his arrest in 2003.

Al Hawsawi transcript of hearing before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal can be downloaded here:
DOD_CSRT_Hawsawi_Transcript_of_Hearing.pdf

KSM’s missing confession

While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed claimed responsibility for planning many terrorist attacks, one is strangely missing in his list: The Djerba bombing in Tunisia. On April 11, 2002, a terrorist attack targeted the Ghriba synagogue, killing 21 people, including 14 German tourists, two French citizens and five Tunisians. KSM’s role was clearly established by German, Spanish and French investigations.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was indicted in France for the Djerba bombing for his role in “planning and coordinating” the attack, according to the order for trial delivered on November 10, 2006. The investigation revealed that at least nine telephone contacts occurred between the suicide bomber, Nizar Naouar or family members, and KSM in the months preceding the attack until the day of the bombing. The last phone calls, according to the French investigation, were made to receive instructions from KSM regarding the launching of the attack.

The investigation also revealed that KSM organized the funding of the operation through Spain, and instructed two associates to provide 5,720 Euros to the bomber. The Spanish financiers were sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment on May 9, 2006. The Spanish Court (SPA_Sentence_Djerba_Bombing.pdf) stated (Page 5 and 12) that KSM had “planed the attack on the synagogue of Ghriba, ordering the suicide bomber Nizar Naouar to carry out the attack”.

KSM's transcript of hearing before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (Revised version released by the DOD on March 15, 2007) can be downloaded here: DOD_CSRT_KSM_Transcript_of_Hearing.pdf

Alleged mastermind of Moroccan terrorist plot arrested

According to the Moroccan authorities, the alleged mastermind of the terrorist plot that was foiled on Sunday after one of the suicide bombers triggered his explosive belt in a cybercafé was arrested only hours before the incident.

According to our information, Abdelaziz Ben Zine (also spelled Ben Zyne), also known as Chafik, is a veteran of Afghanistan, and a long-time leader of the GICM (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group).

Ben Zine was described by a former Emir of the GICM as being in charge of the administration of GICM. Ben Zine undertook a two-months training to explosive devices in Afghanistan provided in 2000 by Saad Houssaini, the GICM military chief arrested last week in Casablanca. He was also trained on techniques of command by Al Qaeda ideologue Abu Musab Al Suri (arrested in 2005). Ben Zine was tasked at the end of 2001 with Hassan El Haski - a GICM commander arrested in Spain in 2004 and indicted for the March 11 attacks in Madrid - to identify Moroccan religious leaders who support Jihad and recruit them. They were also assigned to select economic targets in which members of the group could invest to raise funds for the GICM, and to identify security weaknesses in Morocco to provide escape routes to GICM operatives.

The arrest of Ben Zine (described as Houssaini’s successor following his arrest last week), is a new indication that the GICM is currently mobilizing its operatives in the country to carry out terrorist attacks.

Indeed, the Moroccan authorities have also reportedly arrested Algerian Islamists in the Marrakech region, and others are wanted. The surge in the Islamists activities suggests that strategic coordination is at work with the former GSPC, now known as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to carry out terrorist attacks. Marrakech has been the target of Islamic terrorism on August 24, 1994, when several Islamists, including GIA (ex-GSPC) members, carried out an attack on a hotel resulting in the death of two Spanish tourists, in one of the first terrorist action in the word attributed to the Afghan veterans.

Suicide bombing in Morocco marks the anniversary of the Madrid bombings and signals growing terrorist threat (Updated)

Sunday’s suicide bombing in an Internet Café of Casablanca reflects the growing pressure of the Islamist and terrorist networks in Morocco. The ongoing investigation revealed that suicide bombers were planning larger scale attacks, confirming that the country could be the next target of a North African terrorist network under consolidation following the GSPC offensive in Algeria, causing 50 deaths since the beginning of the year and after violence involving GSPC members erupted in Tunisia in December and January.

The suicide bombing in Casablanca came three years after the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004. It was also in a Cyber café where Moroccan authorities arrested last week in Casablanca a key leader of the GICM (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group), Saad Houssaini, a veteran of Afghanistan and co-founder of the GICM, wanted since the Casablanca bombings of May 2003. Saad Houssaini was also connected to at least one of the Madrid bombers. According to Spanish Court records, in 1996, Hussaini formed in Valencia a radical Islamic group to plan terrorist attacks in Spain and Morocco along with three other activists, including Allekema Lamari. Lamari’s remains were positively identified in the Leganes apartment were several 11M bombers blew themselves up after the attacks. DNA traces of Lamari were later recovered in a car used by the bombers to transport bombing devices on the morning of March 11, 2004. Saad Houssaini is also believed to be related to the 9/11 plot. According to the German authorities, he travelled from Istanbul to Karachi (under the name of Abdellah Hosayni) with Said Bahaji, an alleged member of the Hamburg cell, on September 3, 2001.

The arrest of Houssaini, who appeared as the rising figure among the jihadi groups in Morocco following the Casablanca bombings and the killing of Karim Al Mejjati, alleged mastermind of the Madrid bombings, in Saudi Arabia in April 2005, could have triggered the Sunday’s bombing in Casablanca.

The bombing is a new indication of the growing threat posed by Al Qaeda affiliates in the region in an effort to reinforce and coordinate their actions under the umbrella organization of “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”.

The fight against these networks has been active in Algeria and especially Morocco, where at least two separate terrorist networks have been dismantled over the last 6 months. Efforts have also intensified in Europe, where these networks have many supporters and where they are determined to export their violence. But if the European Intelligence and law-enforcement agencies have proven in the past their strong ability and efficiency in identifying terrorist threats and neutralizing terrorist networks, the European legal framework has failed to provide such efficient and preventive actions against the support networks of these groups.

The best example was provided last October, when a combined action of several European countries, including Italy and Switzerland, led to the arrest of several GSPC financial facilitators. The investigation uncovered that the cell has been able to transfer 1.3 million Euros via banks, 320,000 Euros in money transfers and thousands more via cash couriers to Algeria. Most of the cell members, including its leader Djamel Lounici, have already been identified in connection to terrorist networks as early as 1994. Some of them had already been indicted and condemned before being released in recent years. In one of these early warnings, a telephone intercept conducted in 1994 by the Italian authorities, cell members referred to Europe as a “paradise” where “there is no control whatsoever”. A key member of the cell claimed that the European governments “pretend to be vigilant, but in the end they do nothing. They only try to impress people”.

(Originally posted on March 12, 2007)

UPDATE:

Another sign that the threat level is high in the region is the fact that the US Embassy in Algiers issued yesterday a warning saying “There is information that extremists may be planning to conduct an attack against a commercial aircraft carrying Western workers in Algeria”.

The British Embassy in Algiers issued a similar message on March 13: “We are aware of reports that terrorists may be planning to carry out attacks against aircraft flying into Algeria.”

It should be reminded that a commando of the GIA (Armed Islamic Group), from which emanated the GSPC in 1998, hijacked an Air France plane in December 1994 in Algiers with the initial objective to fly it into the Eiffel Tower. French commandos stormed the plane when it stopped to refuel in Marseilles, killing the four hijackers and rescuing the 170 passengers. The GIA claimed at the time it ordered the hijacking to punish France for its support of the Algerian government.

Exclusive: “Moderate” Muslim Tariq Ramadan was detained, charged and ordered to trial in France after insulting a police officer (Updated)

Tariq Ramadan, the so-called “moderate” Islamic “intellectual”, was briefly detained and charged for “insulting a public agent” on Sunday at Paris Roissy Charles de Gaulle International Airport, while in transit to London.

From informed police sources, we have learned that when Ramadan tried to enter a prohibited area, a young policewoman stopped him. He began shouting at her and was then taken into police custody; the officer filed a complaint against him.

While in custody, he admitted the offense and was ordered to appear before a criminal court of Bobigny on April 6. Tariq Ramadan faces up to 6 months of imprisonment and 7,500 Euros of penalty.

The story is now confirmed by the French media.

UPDATE:

Tariq Ramadan in his own words: According to the own Tariq Ramadan’s account of his detention in Paris last week, published by a Swiss newspaper today, he acknowledged he insulted a policewoman, calling her a “bitch” after she stopped him from going through a security gate without a boarding pass. When a second police officer arrived to assist the first, Ramadan admitted he shouted “you are real bastards”. Ramadan claims he had to spend the whole night in a dirty cell because of the police “overzealousness”.

(Updated on March 20, 2007)

Tariq Ramadan forced to retract defamatory statements

On February 21, 2007, an Islamic website posted an article containing the following comment of Tariq Ramadan regarding my allegations against him: “Brisard knowingly disseminates false allegations against me since years”.

I threatened to file a criminal complaint in France against Tariq Ramadan and expose every single document proving my allegations. So, on March 5, 2007 he retracted his defamatory statement.

During a face to face debate I had with him on Swiss TV in December 2003, I’ve already provided evidence to support my claims. But Ramadan, as usual, denied everything.

Since then, Tariq Ramadan was denied entry to the United States on grounds of “providing material support to a terrorist organization” through donations to organizations supporting Hamas.

As I’ve reported earlier, lots of evidence, ranging from criminal prosecutions to intelligence and police reports, support the fact that Tariq Ramadan has been in contact with several well-known terrorists in Europe during the last 20 years.

The Washington Institute on CTF policy

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy posted today a summary of the excellent address of our esteemed colleague Matthew Levitt on February 23 on “Challenges and Opportunities in the Campaign to Combat Terrorism Financing”. From November 2005 to January 2007, Matthew Levitt served as deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the Treasury Department.

His analysis focuses on the little-understood effort to combat terrorism financing as well as the challenges and opportunities to stop the funds.

Clearly, the US designation of terrorists is the only most visible part of the USG effort to combat terrorism financing. It also includes diplomacy, law enforcement, covert activity, and intelligence collection.

If designation is the most visible part of the US action against terrorism financing, then I believe it should be the most relevant and trusted one. But it is not. The reasons are many: from the persistent weakness of international monitoring systems, to the reliance of this process on political grounds, its classified nature and the absence of legal sanctions, other than a preventive freezing of assets, against individuals and entities for which there is evidence regarding their involvement in financing a terrorist organization.

If we assume that fighting terrorism financing is another avenue to combat terrorism, then, there is no theoretical and legal difference between someone who planed a terrorist attack and someone who provided funds to a terrorist organization for the very same attack to take place. Both of them have provided material support and they are both accomplices of the same act. Practice reflects the fact that the first will generally be arrested and prosecuted, while the other would remain free and even resume his activities to fund terrorism. This is what clearly and fundamentally impedes our efforts to stop terrorism financing.

CTF: Still a long way ahead

The State Department Annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2007 provides an international overview of the efforts of countries around the world to implement and improve Counter Terrorism Financing regimes. Most countries are progressively implementing adequate regulations. Yet, most exposed countries are still lacking willingness, proper regulations, training or coordination to fight terrorism financing.

The report reflects the following major causes of concern:

• 87 countries have not yet criminalized terrorism financing, or 40% of the total countries.
• 56 countries have not yet ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Malaysia.
• Several exposed countries have taken no legal action to prevent the misuse of charitable and other nonprofit entities that can be used as conduits for the financing of terrorism, while weak implementation of regulations is a cause of concern as to the potential for the financing of terrorism through the misuse of charities, including in Kuwait, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi High Commission for Charities to oversee Saudi charities with foreign operations, announced in 2002, is yet to be formally established.
• Several countries still lack a broad definition of terrorism to properly fight all aspects of terrorism financing. This is the case for Turkey which maintains a narrow definition of terrorism applicable only in terms of attacks on Turkish nationals or the Turkish state.
• Other countries lack the training to recognize and investigate terrorism financing, including Algeria and Morocco.

US State Department quoting JCB report to the UN Security Council

The U.S. State Department today issued its annual edition of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, describing the efforts of key countries to attack all aspects of the international drug trade, money laundering and terrorism financing in the past year.

Volume II of the report, regarding Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, quotes the report I’ve submitted at his request to the President of the UN Security Council on December 19, 2002, titled “Terrorism Financing: Roots and trends of Saudi terrorism financing” in the following terms: “Contributions to charities in Saudi Arabia usually consist of Zakat, which refers to an Islamic religious duty with specified humanitarian purposes. According to a 2002 report to the United Nations Security Council, over the past decade al-Qaida and other jihadist organizations collected between $300 and $500 million; and the majority of those funds originated from Saudi charities and private donors.”

Turkey finally enforcing UN sanctions against Kadi, extending investigations

After months of political controversy over the alleged links between Yassin Al Kadi and Turkish ruling party leaders, and a Court decision in July 2006 unfreezing his assets on technical grounds, the High Administrative Court (Council of State) Cases Chamber ruled that UN sanctions must be enforced. This ruling confirms, as previously explained, that when the UN Security Council acts pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in deciding that the funds of certain individuals or entities must be frozen, its decisions are binding on all members of the United Nations and national Courts have no authority to reconsider or contradict such decisions.

Meanwhile, an Istanbul public prosecutor reportedly extended investigations on Yassin Al Kadi to include new documents cited in a recent book. In “Charitable terrorist”, Nedim Sener, a Turkish investigative journalist alleges that a Kadi firm has been founded by the current legal advisor to the Turkish Prime minister. He also claims that a ruling party leader was an associate of Kadi. According to the book, a key institution for Kadi transactions was Albaraka Turk, owned by the Albaraka Banking Group. The current Turkish finance minister, Kemal Unakitan, is a former shareholder and board member of the bank.

See my earlier posts on Yassin Al Kadi and Turkey:

- Al-Qadi close to regaining frozen assets in Turkey
- Turkey flouts UN sanctions on Kadi
- After Kadi’s Turkish ruling: National Courts vs. UN Sanctions
- A Turkish Court decides to unfreeze Kadi assets
- Yassin Al Kadi creates political turmoil in Turkey (Updated)

Yeslam Bin Laden indicted and ordered for trial (update 2)

A year ago, I filed a criminal defamation complaint against Yeslam Bin Laden in the High District Court of Paris, France, after he had made various defamatory statements during an interview published in November 2005.

On February 5, 2007 the French investigative judge issued an “Order for Trial” stating that Yeslam Bin Laden has been indicted and that he is now ordered to appear on trial, an interesting development coming after years of legal harassment against me from Osama Bin Laden’s half-brother.

Yeslam Bin Laden’s companies have been under investigation in France for potential money laundering and terrorism financing since 2001. In December 2006 the case was dismissed for lack of evidence after the Swiss authorities refused to communicate banking records relating to the case. During the course of the French investigation, I appeared as a witness and revealed that Yeslam Bin Laden had maintained a joint bank account with Osama Bin Laden in Switzerland until 1997, while he previously denied having had "any contact with his half-brother for the past 20 years".

UPDATE:

Previous JCB posts on current proceedings and legal decisions against Yeslam Bin laden:

- JCB files criminal complaint against Yeslam Bin Laden
- JCB criminal complaint against Yeslam Bin Laden
- Swiss Supreme Court decision against Yeslam Bin Laden (On my book)
- Swiss decision dismissing Yeslam Bin Laden complaint (On accusations of secrecy violation)

AFP story on Yeslam Bin Laden's order for trial:

AFP (Agence France Presse)

Bin Laden’s half brother to be tried for “complicity of slandering”

PARIS Feb 16, 2007

Businessman Yeslam Binladin, half-brother of the chief of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network Usama Bin Laden, is ordered for trial before the correctional Court of Paris for “complicity of slandering” towards an investigator working for the families of the victims of the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Mr. Binladin, who insists that his name be spelled this way, will be judged at a date not yet announced for remarks published by VSD magazine in its edition of November 30 to December 6, 2005.

The author of the interview and the director of the weekly magazine are also ordered for trial by Parisian judge Michele Ganascia, in a decision of February 5.

The interview of VSD was related in particular to hearings of Mr. Binladin by financial judge Renaud Van Ruymbeke within the framework of an investigation on the accounts of the businessman.

The judge inquired into a possible transfer of funds of $300 million between Switzerland and Pakistan that could have benefited Usama Bin Laden from his half-brother.

The magistrate decided to withdraw the case in January without having been able to conclude his investigations, Switzerland refusing to provide banking documents he required.

This investigation followed declarations of a private investigator, Jean-Charles Brisard, retained by lawyers of the families of September 11.

“The judge speaks a lot with Jean-Charles Brisard who hates me. He is trying to set everything on fire and make me take the blame. He is nervous that I am winning my lawsuits against him. He wants to create doubt”, explained Mr. Binladin in the interview with VSD.

“His business is to manufacture stories. His book (“Bin Laden, the Forbidden Truth”, note) was prohibited in Switzerland. Under the pressure of justice, he had to remove more than twenty-five pages that were untrue and defamatory towards me”, also stated the businessman.

Jean-Charles Brisard filed a libel complaint for these remarks in explaining that he had never lost a single procedure against Mr. Binladin and that no decision was ever taken to cut twenty-five pages for writings about him.

The AFP story was also published in French AFP_YBL_FR.pdf, Spanish and German

The Counterterrorism Blog posted a story on this issue on February 18. You can read it here: French Court Orders Defamation Trial For Usama bin Laden's Half-Brother, Yeslam

A clear warning to the banks: Stop providing banking services to the terrorists

The Almog v. Arab Bank case was brought by victims or family members of victims of suicide and other bombings carried out by various terrorist organizations who allege that Arab Bank had “knowingly provided banking and administrative services to various organizations identified by the US government as terrorist organizations that sponsored suicide bombings and other numerous attacks on innocent civilians in Israel”.

Arab Bank filed a motion to dismiss on the basis, among others, (1) that a heightened pleading standard should apply to terrorist financing cases, and (2) that providing banking services to, and allowing its bank to be used for the transfer of funds to, terrorists and organizations affiliated with terrorists constitutes nothing more than “ordinary banking transactions”.

On January 29, 2007 (almog_v. Arab Bank Opinion and Order 29012007.pdf), the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York partially denied Arab Bank’s motion to dismiss in ruling on two critical issues often arising in terrorism financing cases:

Pleading standards in TF cases

The Court ruled that “None of provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act imposes a heightened pleading standard, nor do any require that Arab Bank have had the specific intent to cause the specific acts which injured plaintiffs… It is sufficient that Arab Bank played a role in a well-publicized plan to reward terrorists killed and injured in suicide bombings and other attacks in Israel; knew that the groups to which it provided services were engaged in terrorist activities; and knew that the funds it received as deposits and transmitted to various organizations were to be used for conducting acts of international terrorism”.

Bank liability standard for business transactions

To escape liability, banks usually argue in terrorism financing cases that they’ve “merely provided routine banking services”. The Court rejected that argument by ruling that “Arab Bank ignores that acts which in themselves may be benign, if done for a benign purpose, may be actionable if done with the knowledge that they are supporting unlawful acts … Given plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the knowing and intentional nature of the Bank’s activities, there is nothing “routine” about the services the Bank is alleged to have provided”. The Court here confirmed a previous ruling in Linde v. Arab Bank in 2005 providing that where “the Bank knows that the groups to which it provides services are engaged in terrorist activities” even the provision of basic banking services may qualify as material support”.

Al Taqwa Bank directors, founders and shareholders to be prosecuted in Egypt

On February 6, 2007, the Egyptian government issued a decree ordering for trial before the military Court 40 members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Among the indicted are at least 5 directors, founders and shareholders of the Al Taqwa Bank, including Youssef Nada, Ali Ghaleb Himmat, Fathi Ahmed Al Khouli, Tawfik Al Waee and Sadek Al Sharkawy. Another indicted, Abdulrahman Saudi, appeared in the Al Taqwa phonebook.

The Al Taqwa Bank was established in 1988 in the Bahamas with significant backing from the Muslim Brotherhood. Activities and affiliates of the bank have since then been mainly managed by Youssef Nada, Ali Ghaleb Himmat and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin. The bank has been designated by the US Treasury Department on November 7, 2001 and by the UN on November 9, 2001.

After the failure of the Swiss prosecution to build a case against the Al Taqwa Bank, the Egyptian trial against the Muslim Brotherhood could provide a new opportunity to expose the links between the bank and extremist or terrorist groups.

Saudi "Terror Financing" Arrests: Some clues

The Saudi Interior Ministry announced on February 3, 2007 the arrest of 10 suspects “carrying out illegal activities including collecting donations illegally ... and sending them to suspected parties”.

The announcement raises questions as to its real objective, as most of the suspects were know for years by the Saudi government as political dissidents. Some were previously detained.

Sulaiman Al Rushudi, a lawyer, was one of the cofounders of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in London in May 1993 closely linked to Osama Bin Laden. He was arrested in September 1994 along with several clerics and was detained for several years. Another CDLR founder, Saad Al-Faqih, has been listed as SDGT in 2004. Also arrested is Essam Al Basrawi, a lawyer who defended reformists during Saudi trials in 2004. Another suspect is a former cleric and attorney, Musa Al Qarni, who had publicly supported Jihad and was a personal friend of Osama Bin Laden during the Afghan war.

Were these arrests really related to “terrorism financing”? And if so, why did the Saudi government act only today when these individuals have been under surveillance for years?

Mohammed Jamal Khalifa (1957-2007)

Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Osama Bin Laden’s brother in law and Al Qaeda financial facilitator, has been reportedly shot dead this morning in Madagascar.

The news comes only days after the Philippine press published on January 22 the last interview of Abu Sayyaf leader’s Khaddafy Janjalani, who was recently killed by the Philippine police and whose brother, the Abu Sayyaf’s founder, was recruited by Khalifa according to the Philippine National Police.

In the interview Janjalani stated that “Jamal Khalifa was a philanthropist who helped Moro and other mujahideen in this world. Our friendship with them is dictated by necessity, convenience and the need to help one another. They needed at that time volunteers for Afghanistan, while we needed money to buy arms, ammunition and other necessities”. He added that “we reciprocated their assistance by providing them volunteers”. Janjalani reported that Khalifa and Ramzi Yousef, the first WTC bomber also involved in the 1994 Bojinka plot to hijack airplaines over the Pacific, provided Abu Sayyaf with $122,000. CNN reported yesterday that Khalifa had denied the charges.

Mohammed Jamal Khalifa served as a front for Osama Bin Laden in establishing numerous organizations, corporations and charitable institutions in the Philippines in the 90s. He hosted and provided funding to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 9/11 planner, and many other known terrorists through the IIRO office in the Philippines, designated by the US Treasury Department on August 8, 2006.

Mohammad Jamal Khalifa was indicted in Jordan for being involved in the bombing of a movie theatre. He was sentenced to death in absentia, on the basis of charges that he had conspired to commit terrorist acts as part of an organization established, among other things, "to fight Jews and Americans," according to court records. Mohammed Jamal Khalifa was deported to Jordan after his arrest in 1994 and retried there on terrorism charges. He was acquitted and returned to Saudi Arabia.

Although labelled a “senior Al Qaeda member” by the US Government, Khalifa was still freely running businesses in the Middle East, Asia and Africa.

Yassin Al Kadi interviewed over freezing of assets

In an interview to the Saudi Okaz newspaper published on December 26, 2006, Yassin Al Kadi confirmed that the Saudi kingdom has submitted an application to the UN to lift his name from the list of associates of the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Al Kadi claims to have lost $200 million in international contracts due to his designation, and to have spent nearly 50 million Riyals ($13,000,000) in lawyers’ fees for his defense since 2001. Al Kadi also accuses the Albanian government to be manipulated by “mafia gangs” after the authorities recently ordered the freezing of additional assets uncovered in the country, including apartments, shops and lands worth $5 million. Since 2001, the Albanian government has sequestrated 40 bank accounts and assets of nearly 20 businesses and properties owned or managed by Yassin Al Kadi.

Nasreddin silent Turkish businesses

More than four years after being designated by the G7 on April 19, 2002, and by the United Nations on April 24, 2002, former Al Taqwa Bank director Ahmed Idris Nasreddin continues to freely run businesses in Turkey through family members, according to the official Turkish corporations’ registration office. Most of the following companies have not even been designated by national or international authorities.

- Nasco Nasreddin Holding
- Nasco Sentetik Elyaf AS
- Nasco Tekstil Sanayi AS
- Nasco Yatirim Ve Sinai Urunler Pazarmala AS
- Nasco Kofeksiyon Tekstil Boya AS
- Nasco Sigorta Acenteligi AS

The most intriguing is not the unwillingness of the Turkish government to take actions against Nasreddin (the Prime minister of this country recently offered a public support to a designated terrorist), but the apparent inability of the international community to enforce its decisions.

Such obvious breaches are confirmed by Interpol’s Secretary General comments to Al Jazeera on November 15 that “there is an international failure to fight terrorism at the most basic level -- that no rational citizen of any of our countries would accept if they were made aware of how significant the failure is and how easy it would be to correct”.

US Treasury designates Hizballah South American fundraisers

The US Treasury Department just announced additional designations of Hizballah fundraisers and operatives in South America. Most of them are members of the Assad Ahmad Barakat's network. Barakat has been designated on June 10, 2004. These actions should definetely silence previous comments suggesting Hizballah had no financial activities in the region. We've pointed out earlier on this blog the extent of the Hizballah network in the Triple Border area, or Tres Fronteras, a coterminous region between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Among designated individuals and entities is Galeria Page, a shopping center located in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, that, according to the US Treasury Department is "considered the central headquarters for Hizballah members" in the area. The building still hosts many businesses that should require additional review and investigations.

A Swiss intelligence informant confirms links between Ayman Al Zawahiri and the Ramadan brothers

According to a former informant for the Swiss intelligence who claims to have been recruited to infiltrate the Islamic Center of Geneva, managed by members of the Ramadan family, including Hani and Tariq, Ayman Al Zawahiri attended two meetings there in Geneva in March 1991.

The information was revealed this week in a Swiss German newspaper quoting the spy's own memos after a trip to Egypt he made in 2005 at the request of Hani Ramadan. His records show he was able to confirm at least one contact between Hani Ramadan and Ayman Al Zawahiri in March 1991; his information indicates "several trips" of Zawahiri in Geneva. It also mentions the fact that the Al Qaeda leader was holding a Swiss passport under the name of Amin Othan (one of Zawahiri known aliases is Amin Othman).

We first published the information about the Geneva meetings on September 13, 2006 on this blog (Tariq Ramadan new links to terror).

Freezing Terrorist Money - Another UK failure

In the past, we have raised several cases of individuals or entities bypassing UN sanctions and assets freezing measures.

The latest example is provided by Abu Hamza Al-Masri (aka. Mustafa Kamel Mustafa). It has emerged this week that only two days before he was charged for inciting murder and racial hatred, Abu Hamza bought a house in Greenford, West London, for £220,000 in cash, while being held at the Belmarsh top-security prison. The house is featured on various websites.

At the same time, the British tax payers paid more than £250,000 in legal aid for this Islamist extremist.

The assets of Abu Hamza were frozen by the US, UN and the UK Treasury since April 2002. According to the UN Resolutions on sanctions against terrorism, governments are required to freeze the funds and other financial assets or economic resources “including funds derived from property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction” and “ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly, for such persons’ benefit”.

This case illustrates once again how ineffective is the assets freezing policy when it lacks the international regulations and tools to properly control and verify its implementation.

Saudi Arabia: Bin Laden WHO???

Since the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., the Saudi government seems to be afflicted with “terrorism amnesia”. The Saudis continue to claim that Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden and their Saudi support networks were all fabricated outside the kingdom aimed against the Kingdom.

On September 20, 2006, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif stated that “Bin Laden (…) is not a Saudi”.

The Saudi reaction to the designation of several offices and a director of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) by the U.S. Treasury Department followed the same trend in the same stunning statement:

“The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) is not a Saudi organization; it is a nongovernmental, multinational organization based in the Kingdom with offices throughout the world. As an international non-governmental organization, the IIRO requires oversight from multinational enforcement entities.”

Despite the Saudi claim, the IIRO is not a UFO, an Unknown Foreign Organization. The IIRO was registered in 1978 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, as publicized on its current and former websites. The IIRO has its registered headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, as an affiliate of the Muslim World League (MWL), also registered in Saudi Arabia in 1962. The MWL Journal itself claimed that “The Kingdom has formed special organizations, such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)”.

Indeed, most recently, during the legal proceedings of the 9/11 lawsuits in the U.S. where the IIRO is a defendant, the Saudis tried to extract the organization claiming it is a “governmental body”.

Despite repeated Saudi attempts to dilute their responsibility, the Kingdom’s failure to regulate its own charities is well reflected in the U.S. designation, which states that Abd Al Hamid Sulaiman Al-Mujil (Executive Director of the IIRO Eastern Province branch office in Saudi Arabia) “provided donor funds directly to al Qaida and is identified as a major fundraiser for the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)”. The designation further alleges that “the Indonesian and Philippines branches of IIRO have received support from IIRO Eastern Province Branch, which in turn is controlled by Al-Mujil”.

In an official publication released in August 2006, the Saudi government proves how little they do to stop terrorism. While U.S. Treasury officials have labeled the Kingdom as the "epicenter" of terrorism financing, in 5 years since the 9/11 attacks, it froze “more than 40 bank accounts” – for over 1,600 accounts frozen worldwide- (in 2003 this country already stated to have frozen 41 bank accounts belonging to 7 individuals for a total of $5,697,400, or less than 4% of the total amount of terrorist-related funds frozen worldwide). However, international investigations uncovered thousands of terrorist-related bank accounts all leading to the Kingdom. The Saudis provide no explanation to this wide discrepancy.

The Saudi government continues to deny that for decades now several of its institutions, agents, scholars and businesses promoted, sponsored and supported Islamic terrorism. Indeed the former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar, stated in 2001 that "we have never worried about the effect of these organizations on our country". And as long as they get away with it, we have a lot to worry about.

Tariq Ramadan state of denial

Since Tariq Ramadan’s US visa was recently officially denied, and after we’ve published evidence linking him to convicted terrorists in Europe, many so called “intellectual” voices have supported him in Europe while he continues to deny the facts against the obvious reality.

Contrary to statements I read and receive every day from his supporters, the United States is not the first Western country to deny access to Tariq Ramadan. From November 1995 until May 1996, the French government denied entry to Tariq Ramadan, who was considered at the time as a “central figure of the European Islamist movement”.

To claim that there is no evidence supporting allegations against him is also simply wrong. During a face to face debate I had with him on Swiss TV in December 2003, I’ve provided all material evidence supporting my claims. Tariq Ramadan, as usual, while facing the obvious, denied every single claim against him:

He denied his contacts with Djamel Beghal, stating that his statements were obtained under torture, that Beghal is illiterate and would not be able to write his speeches as he claimed. He denied ever meeting him, as claimed by Beghal himself before a French judge without any torture. He denied his contacts with Ahmed Brahim, claiming he didn’t know him and asked me to provide evidence of telephone intercepts, while the Spanish police was claiming “regular contacts” between them. He denied having organized a meeting attended by Ayman Al Zawahiri and Omar Abdel Rahman in Geneva in 1991, claiming he was not present in Switzerland at the time and providing a statement from some Swiss official saying Switzerland cannot confirm the presence of Zawahiri in the country at the time of the meeting. He even denied being a director of the Geneva Islamic Center, a position he still holds until now according to the official Swiss register of companies.

The same way, he labelled “ridiculous” a Swiss intelligence report stating he is “still a major figure of the Muslim Brotherhood” and has been “named in 1993 by the same Muslim Brotherhood Organization as the leader for Da’awa (the Call / indoctrination) in Europe” or the fact that according to the same report, “Omar Abdel Rahman is the uncle of the Ramadan brothers”.

Tariq Ramadan was denied entry in the Unites States for donations he had made to designated organizations, the CBSP and the ASP (see my earlier post). Interestingly, a French newspaper recently revealed that one of Ramadan’s assistant was specifically in charge of collecting funds for the CBSP. But this also would probably be denied by Tariq Ramadan.

Tariq Ramadan state of denial is not new. It is simply another expression of his doublespeak standard.

US visa denied to Tariq Ramadan for terrorism financing

Following our recent press release on “New Information about Tariq Ramadan’s Links to Terrorism” exposing new evidence that Tariq Ramadan had links to many convicted terrorists in Europe, the USG finally denied a visa to the Islamic scholar “for providing material support to a terrorist organization”.

The US State Department stated that, among other things, since year 2000, Ramadan donated about $765 to French and Swiss organizations, namely the Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (CBSP) and the Association de Secours Palestinien (ASP), both designated by the US Treasury Department on August 22, 2003 for their financial support to Hamas. The USG stated at the time that these organizations are “part of a web of charities raising funds on behalf of Hamas and using humanitarian purposes as a cover for acts that support Hamas”.

Despite the fact that these organizations were not designated in Europe, the CBSP and ASP have appeared in several terrorist investigations since 1995, when the prosecution of the 1995 bombings in Paris revealed that Algerian GIA members were raising funds for the CBSP.

Contrary to what Tariq Ramadan still claims, he was denied entry in the US not for his ideas or views. He is not the “victim” of any “ideological exclusion” but the sole responsible of his own actions in supporting terrorism.

Al-Qadi close to regaining frozen assets in Turkey

The Turkish Daily News today publishes the following report after the government renounced to appeal a Court decision unfreezing the assets of Yassin Al Kadi. This is now confirmed by the Foreign Ministry. (see my earlier post on this issue).

Al-Qadi close to regaining frozen assets in Turkey
ANKARA - TDN with AP
Friday, September 22, 2006

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has dropped its appeals against a court decision that freed the frozen assets of a suspected al-Qaeda financier, the Foreign Ministry said on Thursday.

The previous government in Turkey had ordered the assets of Saudi businessman Yasin al-Qadi frozen after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, saying that he was suspected of channeling money to terrorist organizations. The European Union and United States have also frozen his assets.

An administrative court overturned the order in July on technical grounds and ordered that the assets be returned, after a challenge made by al-Qadi with support voiced by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Erdoğan's office and the Foreign Ministry gave no reason behind the appeals to block the court order and keep the assets frozen, made in September, but confirmed on Thursday that the appeals had been withdrawn.

"I know Mr. Yasin, and I believe in him as I believe in myself" Erdoğan told NTV on July 11. "It is not possible for Mr. Yasin to establish ties with a terrorist organization and support it. ... He is a person who has no specialty other than being a philanthropist", he added.

U.S. Treasury officials allege that the Saudi-based Muwafaq Foundation, which al-Qadi heads, is an al-Qaeda front used to funnel millions of dollars to the global terror organization.

Deniz Baykal, leader of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), accused Erdoğan's government of blocking an investigation into al-Qadi's financial affairs focusing on reported money transfers by Erdoğan's adviser Cüneyd Zapsu to al-Qadi in the 1990s when the two were business partners. CHP deputy Atilla Kart filed a parliamentary question on Thursday, asking Interior Minister Abdülkadır Aksu why Erdoğan was protecting al-Qadi.

The previous Turkish government had issued a Cabinet decree to freeze the assets of al-Qadi and another suspected al-Qaeda financier in December 2001, in line with a U.N. Security Council Resolution relating to those suspected of funding terrorist organizations.

At the time, Finance Ministry inspectors also began to investigate al-Qadi's ties in Turkey but later claimed in a report that Erdoğan's government tried to block the probe.

Turkey flouts UN sanctions on Kadi

On July 20, 2006, the Turkish Council of State (Turkish highest administrative Court) took the unprecedented step of overturning a government order freezing the assets of Yassin Al Kadi, after he had been designated as an individual associated to Al Qaeda and the Taliban by the UN Security Council.

Days after this decision, which clearly contravened UN sanctions, Turkish government’s spokesman made it clear Turkey will appeal the Council of State ruling to fulfill its international obligations. The decision was indeed appealed on August 31st through a government petition.

But only six days later, apparently at the request of Prime Minister Erdogan, a new petition was filed annulling the previous and renouncing to appeal the Council of State ruling.

In a previous post on this issue, I’ve stated that the Council of State decision could force the Turkish government to take a clear stand on the Kadi issue and beyond to show its real willingness to respect its international and European obligations.

We now have a clear answer from the Turkish government. After offering a public support to Yassin Al Kadi in July, following revelations that Kadi had received funds from a close advisor to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, the Turkish government is now taking a new step in contradicting its obligations under the UN Charter.

The Turkish stand on Kadi raises many concerns: For the UN, this issue is not essential only for the future and effectiveness of the international sanctions against terrorism financing. It is also vital for the authority of the UN, while many are questioning its ability to establish international norms to fight terrorism and while many others call for the UN to take a central role in coordinating counter-terrorism policies. For the United States, which first designated Yassin Al Kadi, this decision could be a major setback. For the European Union, it is a clear signal that the Turkish government, despite its willingness to enter Europe, is unable to respect its most fundamental obligations and is ready to ignore European Court rulings and international sanctions.

For more information, see my previous posts on this issue:

- After Kadi’s Turkish ruling: National Courts vs. UN Sanctions, July 20, 2006
- A Turkish Court decides to unfreeze Kadi assets, July 20, 2006
- Yassin Al Kadi creates political turmoil in Turkey (Updated), July 17, 2006

Tariq Ramadan new links to terror

Following a decision of the US government not to appeal a court ruling ordering it to either issue a visa or provide good reasons for not doing so, Tariq Ramadan is on the eve of entering the United States, two years after his visa was revoked, based on provisions of the US Patriot Act allowing exclusion of foreign citizens who have “endorsed or espoused terrorism”.

Tariq Ramadan has always denied endorsing terrorism or having any contact with terrorists in Europe. When confronted to the evidence I've provided during a face to face debate on Swiss TV in December 2003, he again denied these contacts. On terrorism and the use of suicide attacks against civilians he used his favorite "double standard" position: he condemned these acts "globally", but found them justified "contextually".

The evidence provided included the following:

- A Spanish Police General Directorate memo dated 1999 stating that Ahmed Brahim (sentenced to 10 years in prison for incitement to terrorism in April 2006) maintained "regular contacts with important figures of radical Islam such as Tariq Ramadan".

- The minutes of Djamel Beghal’s (sentenced to 10 years in prison in March 2005) first appearance testimony on October 1st, 2001 (following his indictment by a French antiterrorist judge for his participation to a foiled terrorist attack against the US Embassy in Paris), where he stated that before 1994, he "attended the courses given by Tarek Ramadan". According to the final prosecution documents, during his first interrogation before UAE authorities who arrested him, Beghal stated on September 22, 2001, that "his religious engagement started in 1994" when "he was in charge of writing the statements of Tariq Ramadan".

- A Swiss intelligence memo of 2001 stating that "brothers Hani and Tariq Ramadan coordinated a meeting held in 1991 in Geneva attended by Ayman Al Zawahiri and Omar Abdel Rahman", respectively Al Qaeda leader and planner of the terrorist attack against the World Trade Center in 1993, and sentenced to life in the United States.

- A human source testimony corroborating this information and stating that at the end of a friday prayer at the Islamic Center of Geneva in 1991, Hani Ramadan, brother of Tariq Ramadan, told the audience that a conference will be held few days later with Ayman Al Zawahiri, describing him as an “Islamic Mujahideen”.

- An abstract of the Al Taqwa Bank (listed as SDGT) phonebook seized at Youssef Nada's house in 2001 where the Ramadan’s family name precedes the mention of "Said Ramadan", Tariq and Hani Ramadan’s father.

New documents reveal that Tariq Ramadan had contacts with other terrorists in Europe.

According to the final French prosecution filing (dated December 8, 2005) against the "Chechen networks", who had planned chemical attacks in France "under the supervision of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi", Menad Benchellali (Head of the network who was sentenced to 10 years in prison in June 2006) traveled to Switzerland "one or two times in 2000 to attend conferences on Islam provided by Tariq Ramadan".

The US designation of IIRO offices: a long expected and symbolic CTF initiative

Almost five years after the 9/11 attacks, and after months of internal debate within the US administration, the Treasury Department finally decided to take action against the International Islamic Relief organization (IIRO), a Saudi so called “charitable organization” identified since at least 1992 as being connected to the Al Qaeda network.

Since the inception of Al Qaeda, the IIRO has played a crucial role in building and improving the logistical and financial infrastructure of the terrorist group.

According to historical Al Qaeda documents seized in Bosnia in March 2002, that were later made public after I persuaded the Bosnian authorities to turn them to the 9/11 families, the IIRO was among the few Saudi charities to have been selected to be part of an Al Qaeda committee formed to “receive donations”. According to Abdullah Azzam, Al Qaeda co-founder, the IIRO was at the “forefront” of the Islamic foundations that contributed to the “Jihadist arena”.

In the 90s, an array of facts and evidence emerged from several governments confirming that the IIRO was at best a front of terrorist organizations and that most of the funds it raised were diverted to these groups.

The IIRO was present at every stage of the terrorist process, from the provision of ideological and propaganda tools and materials, to the provision of arms and military training for the terrorists. The IIRO also provided transportation, protection, facilities and cover to Al Qaeda members, in addition to its essential role in financially supporting the terrorist infrastructure.

The IIRO was also active on every single Jihadi front, from Afghanistan to Chechnya, from Bosnia to Sudan and more recently in Iraq. The organization was also linked to several terrorist actions and plots, including the 1998 Embassy bombings in Africa and the “Bojinka plan” that inspired the 9/11 attacks.

The numerous facts and evidence collected against the IIRO included the following, to name only a few:

- In 1994, Philippine authorities detained Mahmoud Abdel-Jalil, the Jordanian regional director of the International Islamic Relief Organization on charges of financially supporting the Abu Sayyaf organization, an Islamic extremist group linked to Al Qaeda.

- In 1996, a CIA report on Islamic charities mentioned the IIRO as “affiliated with the Muslim World League, a major international organization largely financed by the government of Saudi Arabia”. The CIA reported that “[t]he former head of the IIRO office in the Philippines, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa (brother-in-law to UBL), has been linked to Manila-based plots to target the Pope and US airlines (Bojinka)”. In addition, US intelligence mentioned that “The IIRO helps fund six militant training camps in Afghanistan”.

- In 2001, a French intelligence report mentioned that the IIRO funded the Darunta terrorist training camp, a facility used by Al Qaeda for chemical and biological weapons testing.

- In 2002, Omar al Farouq, Al Qaeda representative in Southeast Asia testified that the IIRO directors in Indonesia interacted with local organizations to finance and provide military training for Jemaah Islamiyah members.

I was among the many experts and officials who, for years, have been lobbying for the step partially achieved today with the designation of two IIRO offices and a Saudi director for the organization. The UN Al Qaeda Monitoring Group played a major role in recommending the listing of the IIRO in 2003. More recently, during Congressional hearings held in 2005, several Treasury officials acknowledged that the IIRO was a major cause of concern.

It’s worth mentioning that the designation was not announced as a joint initiative with the Saudi government but as a unilateral action by the US Treasury. Saudi official reaction will be interesting to follow as this government, despite its repeated promises, failed to implement regulatory rules to severe the control over its charities.

The US Designation is a first step that should now be fully implemented by the international institutions, including the UN. It is still a limited step that does not reflect the full range and extent of the support and assistance provided by the IIRO to terrorist activities in various countries.

Hezbollah South American financial ring

A recent news report suggested that Hezbollah had virtually no financial activities in South America and that the US government made false allegations regarding its presence in the region.

It should be recalled that for years, US and local authorities have provided clear evidence that several terrorist organizations have been able to settle their activities, or part of them in the South-American area of Triple Border, or Tres Fronteras, a coterminous region between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, comprising the cities of Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), Puerto Iguazu (Argentina), and Foz de Iguazu (Brazil). The Arab population of the zone is believed to number over 20,000, mostly Shiite Lebanese Diaspora. The US Department of State report, Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2000, characterized the Triple Border area as "a focal point for Islamic extremism” and the latest annual State Department terrorism report explicitly regards the Triple Border as a main source of financing for both Hamas and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah's involvement in the zone was first revealed when Argentina authorities concluded that the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and the Argentine-Israeli Community Center in Buenos Aires in 1994 were carried out by Hezbollah cells headquartered in Ciudad del Este.

A Paraguayan investigation conducted in 2000 led to the arrest of Lebanese businessman, Ali Khalil Mehri, who had been allegedly selling millions of dollars worth of pirated software and funneling the proceeds to Hezbollah. A CD confiscated from his store in the Triple Border area contained images of "terrorist propaganda of the extremist group Al-Muqawama," an extremist wing of Hezbollah. Moreover, documents seized during the raid included fundraising forms for an organization linked to Hezbollah, Al-Shahid, dedicated to "the protection of families of martyrs and prisoners," as well as documents of money transfers to Canada, Chile, the United States and Lebanon of more than $700,000.

Investigators have also monitored for years the activities of Assad Ahmad Barakat (Listed as SDGT by the US Treasury Department on 06/10/2004), the alleged ringleader of Hezbollah's financial network in the Triple Border area. Barakat arrived in Paraguay in 1985 from Lebanon. According to investigators, Barakat set up a large network of businesses in Ciudad del Este that were involved in illicit fundraising for Hezbollah (Several of his businesses were later listed as SDGT). In 2000, he fled to Brazil. In October 2001, police raided a wholesale electronics store owned by Barakat and arrested two of his employees. The raid uncovered documents showing that they had sent periodic remittances of $25,000-50,000 to Hezbollah, as well as videos and literature that a Paraguayan official said "encouraged young men to join Hezbollah's war against Israel and become suicide bombers”. The police also seized a letter from Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah saying that he "is one of the most thankful for the contributions Assad Ahmad Barakat has sent from the Triple Border”. Investigators also uncovered a meeting attended by Imad Fayez Mugniyah (Hezbollah military chief) and Assad Ahmad Barakat on December 12, 2001.

For a complete overview, the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress issued a detailed report on the Triple Border area in July 2003.

Somalia : The Saudi factor

Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer testified last month before the House International Relations Committee that the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that took power in Somalia includes foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and other Arab states, and has been financially supported by individuals in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Prince Sultan, Saudi deputy Prime minister and Minister of defense and aviation, denied the charges on July 5, 2006.

Islamic groups in Somalia have a long history of financial ties with Saudi organizations. The ICU is an offshoot of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiyya (AIAI), a terrorist group with strong ties to Al Qaeda and linked to the 1998 US Embassy bombings. With no surprise, most of the Courts Union’s leadership emerged from Al Itihaad, including its current Chairman, Hassan Dahir Aweys.

Aweys, who used to live in Saudi Arabia, was vice-Chairman and military commander of Al Itihaad, in charge of contacts with the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and other Saudi organizations. On March 11, 2002, the Al Haramain office in Somalia has been designated by the Treasury Department on the basis that it was linked to Al Qaeda. The designation fact sheet mentioned that Al Haramain Somalia employed AIAI members and provided them with salaries through Al-Barakaat Bank (also designated on November 7, 2001 because of its activities as a principal source of funding for Osama bin Laden). The USG indicated that in late-December 2001, Al Haramain Somalia was facilitating the travel of AIAI members in Somalia by providing funds and requesting visas from the Saudi Arabian Government on the basis that they would be traveling to Saudi Arabia for reasons of religious pilgrimage. On arrival in Saudi Arabia the AlAI members planned to apply for residency permits.

According to a secret report of the Somali Reconciliation & Restoration Council dated September 29, 2001, “Islamic extremist fundamentalism in Somalia has its roots in the Middle-East Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt” and is “mostly funded by Saudi Arabia and Gulf philanthropic Islamic organizations”. The report stresses that the Islamic fundamentalism political recruitment “gained new growth” from the implementation of Saudi academic and educational institutions specialized in Wahhabi Islamic teachings. It also points out the role of several Saudi NGOs in providing support to AIAI.

Despite the repeated Saudi promises that they will control their charities, it becomes obvious that not only they have failed to do so until now, but that the flow of money will continue to reach Islamic extremists.

After Kadi’s Turkish ruling: National Courts vs. UN Sanctions

In light of the Turkish decision unfreezing the assets of Yassin Al Kadi (see my earlier post), the European Court of Justice heard a similar case last year brought by the same Yassin Al Kadi seeking annulment of European sanctions implementing UN resolutions.

On September 25, 2005, the Court dismissed Kadi’s application and made the following reasoning as to its jurisdiction, and more generally on local courts jurisdiction to challenge decisions taken to implement UN sanctions (the judgment was appealed by Yassin Al Kadi on November 17, 2005).

The Court determined that “where, acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council, through its Sanctions Committee, decides that the funds of certain individuals or entities must be frozen, its decision is binding on the members of the United Nations”. In implementing these sanctions, the Court stated that states have “acted under circumscribed powers, with the result that they had no autonomous discretion. In particular, they could neither directly alter the content of the resolutions at issue nor set up any mechanism capable of giving rise to such alteration”. The Court determined therefore that “any review of the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation (…) would therefore imply that the Court is to consider, indirectly, the lawfulness of those resolutions. In that hypothetical situation, in fact, the origin of the illegality alleged by the applicant would have to be sought, not in the adoption of the contested regulation but in the resolutions of the Security Council which imposed the sanctions”. The Court decided there was no basis of international law or others law that could justify its jurisdiction to review indirectly the lawfulness of the UN sanctions, and that such jurisdiction would be incompatible with the undertaking of the member states under the UN Charter.

The Court ruled that “the resolutions of the Security Council at issue fall, in principle, outside the ambit of the Court’s judicial review and that the Court has no authority to call in question, even indirectly, their lawfulness (…). On the contrary, the Court is bound, so far as possible, to interpret and apply that law in a manner compatible with the obligations of the member states under the [UN Charter]”. The Court determined that it was only “empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council in question with regard to jus cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of public international law binding on all subjects of international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no derogation is possible”.

The Court highlighted the fact that “the applicant’s interest in having a court hear his case on its merits is not enough to outweigh the essential public interest in the maintenance of international peace and security in the face of a threat clearly identified by the Security Council” in accordance with the UN Charter.

In addition it’s worth mentioning that the UN has defined a set of rules, including the right for an individual or an entity to petition to be de-listed (Guidelines of the 1267 Sanctions Committee).

In no way has the UN agreed for national institutions or Courts to reconsider, contradict or violate their own international obligations derived from the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law.

A Turkish Court decides to unfreeze Kadi assets

On July 20, 2006 a Turkish administrative court overturned a government order to seize the assets of Yassin Al Kadi, designated as an individual associated to Al Qaeda and the Taliban by the UN Security Council. The decision was apparently made on technical grounds.

The decision came days after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan defended al-Qadi as a "charitable person" and after the Turkish press revealed that Yassin Al Kadi had received funds from a close advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister.

This unprecedented Turkish ruling clearly contradicts the international obligations of the Turkish government. As recently reaffirmed by the European Court of Justice, “according to international law, the obligations of the Member States of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations prevail over any other obligation".

The situation created by this decision will now force the Turkish government to take a clear stand on the Kadi issue and beyond to show its real willingness to respect its international and European obligations.

Yassin Al Kadi creates political turmoil in Turkey (Updated)

After weeks of intense political fight on revelations that designated terrorist Yassin Al Kadi had received funds from a close advisor of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, based on a secret report of the Turkish financial intelligence unit, the political climate reached another stage when the Prime minister himself defended publicly his advisor and dismissed allegations against Yassin Al Kadi during an interview with Turkish TV channel NTV on July 11, 2006. Erdogan stated “I know Yasin, I believe in him as I do in myself. He is a charitable person who loves Turkey”. Erdogan added that it was impossible that Kadi would be linked with terrorism. The opposition party decided to file a lawsuit against the Prime minister’s advisor (Cuneyd Zapsu) and Yassin Al Kadi. While Turkey tries to reach the shores of the European Union, this new provocative stance sounds like a rejection of the international and European order that should have inspired the Turkish Prime minister. As recently stated by the European Court of Justice in a case brought by Yassin Al Kadi against his designation, “according to international law, the obligations of the Member States of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations prevail over any other obligation, including their obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and under the EC Treaty”. Indeed, UN designations are made pursuant to resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are therefore binding on all UN member states. Turkish Prime minister Erdogan becomes the first head of state to officially contradict UN sanctions against terrorism.

The Turkish Prime minister spokesman, Mehmet Akif Beki, explained on July 16, 2006 that while the UN Security Council’s list includes names of some people who are thought to provide financial support to terrorist organisations, this list was not based on a court decision. “Therefore, being mentioned in this list does not mean that these persons are guilty or their guilt is proved by a court decision”. He further stated that "The UN member states have been asked to freeze the assets and bank accounts of the mentioned persons who are included in the list on suspicion and without being granted any right to defend themselves”. The Spokesman added that "The Turkish government is naturally fulfilling its obligations stemming from its membership of the UN. However, no case has been filed against Al Qadi in the USA, Turkey or any other country on charges that he backs terrorist organisations". It should be noted that any listed individual has the right to challenge his designation. Yassin Al Kadi has been challenging his designation in many countries with no result until now. In addition, to state that no case has been filed against Yassin Al Kadi is simply wrong. The Swiss Federal Prosecutor opened a case against Al Kadi on October 15, 2001. Al Kadi was indicted on July 1, 2003. On June 15, 2005, it was transferred to a Swiss Federal investigative judge and the case is still pending. In any event, until Yassin Al Kadi remains on the UN list, any government has the obligation to apply the sanctions decided against him.

Chafiq Ayadi fails to challenge terror designation

Chafiq Ayadi, designated on October 19, 2001 by the UN Sanctions Committee, followed by the European Union the same day, sued the Council and Commission of the European Union to obtain the annulment of these measures on August 26, 2002. On July 12, 2006, the First Instance Court of the European Court of Justice (ecj_press_release.pdf) denied the claim and ruled that "the freezing of funds, financial assets and other economic resources of the persons identified by the Security Council as being associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban is not incompatible with the fundamental rights of the human person falling within the ambit of jus cogens, in light of the public-interest objective of fundamental importance to the international community which is to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts" The Court ruling on Chafiq Ayadi, a former director of the Muwafaq Foundation comes ahead of an appeal ruling in the case of Yassin Al Kadi, former executive director of Muwafaq.